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THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION OF LAND
POLLUTION: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE
ON APPLYING THE BREAKING THE
LOGJAM PRINCIPLES TO
WASTE MANAGEMENT
JOHN S. APPLEGATE*
INTRODUCTION
Professors Stewart and Adler have written thoughtfully of the
challenges of regulating, respectively, nuclear and hazardous waste
in an effective and efficient manner. Each points to ways in which
application of the Breaking the Logjam principles could make
valuable improvements in the legal regimes for these categories of
dangerous, land-disposed waste. Stewart seeks to repair a system
for managing numerous types of nuclear waste, which he
regards—with justification—as largely dysfunctional.1 Adler
argues that the system for the management of hazardous waste is
unduly centralized and inflexible, especially since hazardous waste
is, in his view, an essentially local and relatively contained
environmental problem.2 This comment adds a temporal dimension
to the consideration of both waste types.
Unlike air and water pollution, land pollution (that is, the
management of dangerous solid and liquid wastes on land) remains
a relatively concentrated, active hazard for long periods of time.
Uncontrolled, land pollution moves through the environment
slowly and often without significant diminution of toxicity.
Persistence, in fact, is often regarded as the defining quality of
dangerous land pollutants.3 Even controlled, which is to say
*
Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law and Executive Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs, Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington.
1
Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a
Bankrupt System, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 783 (2008).
2
Jonathan H. Adler, Reforming our Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policy, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 724 (2008).
3
E.g., Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 23,
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isolated from the environment, land pollution retains its hazardous
qualities for long periods of time. Indeed, one of the ironies of
hazardous waste management is that the more effectively the waste
is isolated, the more effectively its hazardous qualities are
protected: it can neither degrade nor disperse. (Radioactive decay
is not slowed by isolation, of course, but neither can it be
accelerated by natural processes.4) It is true that water pollutants
can be deposited in sediments, that contaminants in aquifers often
move slowly, and that air pollutants can remain in the stratosphere
for decades—but none poses a focused threat for as long as
hazardous and nuclear waste. Accordingly, there is no notable
temporal dimension to air and water pollution laws or regulations,
but hazardous and nuclear waste regulation is very much
concerned with the problem of maintaining the isolation of solid
and liquid materials over decades, centuries, and even millennia.5
To say that time is a concern of hazardous and nuclear waste
regulation is not to say, however, that regulation is particularly
successful in addressing that concern. In fact, there is good reason
to believe that waste management practices and institutions are not
well designed to perform over the time periods during which the
waste remains dangerous. In particular, institutions do not exist
that have any kind of record of ability to monitor and safeguard
waste material over decades, centuries, or millenia.6 The temporal
2001,
reprinted
in
40
I.L.M.
532
(2001),
available
at
http://www.pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext_en.pdf.
4
Techniques for transmuting radioactive waste into less dangerous isotopes
have been suggested, but they are in the earliest stages of development. “It is
generally agreed that it is not feasible to deal with existing waste by this process;
the technology, if feasible, would form an intrinsic part of the fuel cycle of future
programmes.” PETER RILEY, NUCLEAR WASTE: LAW, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM
45 (Ashgate 2004).
5
See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 60.113 (2008) (requiring 300 years for package
integrity, 1000 years for radiation leaks); 40 C.F.R. §§ 191.13–119.15 (2006)
(requiring 10,000 years for surrounding areas for high-level waste); see also
Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(requiring a greater than 10,000 year compliance period for the Yucca Mountain
deep geologic repository).
6
John S. Applegate & Stephen Dycus, Institutional Controls or Emperor’s
Clothes? Long-Term Stewardship of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 28 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10631, 10639 (1998); Katherine N. Probst, Long-Term Stewardship and
the Nuclear Weapons Complex: The Challenge Ahead, 131 RESOURCES 14, 15
(1998); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, LONG-TERM INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT
OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LEGACY WASTE SITES (2000). The track record
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dimension of waste management thus presents a particularly
interesting occasion to apply the Breaking the Logjam regulatory
principles that Professors Stewart, Schoenbrod, and Wyman have
developed.7 Specifically, consideration of the long-term nature of
waste disposal offers important opportunities to apply crosscutting regulatory approaches that address underlying causes. The
principle of expanding the use of market incentives and
information may be particularly useful in accomplishing this
objective. The temporal dimension also offers an opportunity to
insist on openness about trade-offs, and decision making will
undoubtedly benefit from an informed, transparent, and
deliberative approach. The temporal aspect presents a conceptual
challenge, however, to scaling regulatory authority to the problem.
These comments conclude with the suggestion of an additional
principle of institutional learning and the conservation of options.
In any long-term effort one must expect that over time we will
come to understand a problem better and so develop better ideas
for addressing it. These improvements can only be implemented if
the regulatory system is capable of learning and if decisions now
leave open options for the future.
I. RISK, COST, AND TIME
The salience of temporal concerns in the management of
nuclear and hazardous waste has important consequences for their
management. These wastes not only pose risks of various kinds
and to various groups of people in the present, but also far into the
future. The challenges of long-term management of waste have
been most extensively explored in the context of nuclear waste,
perhaps because we are accustomed to thinking about nuclear
waste in terms of time, that is, half lives. However, time is at least
as important to other hazardous wastes. Radioactive substances
decay—albeit usually over centuries or millennia—but other
elements do not. As a result, toxic metals like nickel, mercury,
arsenic, and lead are, for all practical purposes, forever. There are
thousands of sites containing such “ordinary” toxic materials in
of institutions in protecting even items of great value, such as texts, jewels,
records, and artwork, is minimal, and preservation has depended primarily on
luck. Applegate & Dycus, supra at 10645.
7
Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and
Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008).
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significant quantities, and their long-term management receives
almost no attention. Indeed, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), the primary regulator of such wastes, in
effect washes its hands of these sites a mere thirty years after
closure.8 In sum, the longevity of both nuclear and hazardous
waste poses serious and unique challenges to its proper
management.
A. The Life Cycle of Hazardous and Nuclear Waste
Industrial waste has a life cycle that begins with the raw
materials that go into a manufacturing or other industrial process,
continues through the design and operation of the process itself,
then the generation of the waste products, the treatment (if any) of
the waste, the storage and transportation of the waste, disposal on
land, and finally remediation of ineffective disposal.9 Adjustments
at any of these phases of the life cycle can have important
downstream effects on the volume and characteristics—indeed, on
the existence—of the resulting waste and its human health and
environmental consequences. For example, choice of raw materials
or process design changes can eliminate a component that
contributes to the hazard of the resulting waste. Minimization of
the use of chlorine is often advocated for precisely this reason,
since chlorine is a kind of radix malorum of many persistent
hazardous pollutants. Likewise, more efficient use of raw materials
in the production process itself can reduce their presence in waste,
as many companies have found by doing careful analyses of
inputs, processes, and wastes.10 Moreover, it is universally agreed
that, all other things being equal, it is both cheaper and more
effective to avoid creation of the waste in the first place than to
manage it after it has been created.
Federal and state waste management laws and regulations are
overwhelmingly concerned with the phases of the life cycle after
8

40 C.F.R. § 264.117(a) (2007).
Our present concern is disposal on land. See generally JOHN S. APPLEGATE
& JAN G. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA, CERCLA, AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 18–20 (Foundation Press 2006).
10
See generally Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series
Environmental Management Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to
Government Regulation?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 237 (2000) (describing the use of an
international standard for measuring inputs and waste outputs).
9
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the waste is generated. With the exception of the voluntary
programs under the Pollution Prevention Act11 and the occasional
state law,12 they are concerned with the fate of wastes that already
exist. The management system under RCRA13 often styles itself as
cradle-to-grave regulation, because it tracks waste from its creation
to disposal. However, Professor Gaba has correctly observed that
this is really “deathbed to grave” regulation, because early
opportunities to reduce or eliminate the generation of the waste are
almost entirely ignored.14
To extend the metaphor, the afterlife of waste—
remediation—is addressed in great detail and at enormous expense
in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund).15 CERCLA’s
prehistory is the disposal of hazardous waste on land in a way that
did not, as it turns out, effectively isolate it.16 This leads to a
polluted present in which the current condition of the land includes
the presence of non-isolated wastes. In CERCLA terminology, this
constitutes a “release” of a hazardous substance, which triggers
response authorities.17 The response authorities include a range of
activities of shorter or longer duration and short- or long-term
objectives, which are needed to destroy, isolate, or re-isolate the
waste. The objectives are established with reference to the
expected condition and use of the land immediately following
remediation and for the near-term future. Thus, EPA and other
agencies consider the extent of predicted future human exposure
patterns in assessing the appropriate nature and extent of
remediation. For example, industrial re-use (“brownfields”)
necessitates a less extensive clean-up because such a use results in
lower exposure levels to persons at the site and thus lower risks to
11

42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–13109 (2000).
E.g., Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21I,
§§ 1–23 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
13
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992(k) (2000).
14
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Solid Waste and Recycled Materials Under RCRA:
Separating Chaff from Wheat, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 651 (1989).
15
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000).
16
See Applegate & Dycus, supra note 6; John S. Applegate & Steven M.
Wesloh, Short Changing Short-Term Risk: A Study of Superfund Remedy
Selection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 270 (1998).
17
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(22) (2000) (definition of “release”); 42 U.S.C. §
9604(a)(1) (2000) (response authorities).
12
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them.18 Finally, “long-term stewardship” means long-term
management of the remaining contamination or waste to assure its
continuing isolation to protect human health and the environment.
The general rule also applies to the grave and afterlife, that it
is both cheaper and more effective to avoid waste production in the
first place. Waste that does not escape does not have to be cleaned
up, and so better management and control practices at the earlier
stages are greatly preferred to remediation. Even though most
wastes cannot be made to disappear entirely, because elements
cannot practically be destroyed, isolating them, gathering them
into a well defined location, treating them for stability, and
controlling access will result in a safer near-term and more reliable
long-term future.
B. Waste Management Options
One of the strongest arguments for addressing waste early in
its life cycle is that the basic options for managing waste are
actually quite limited. In contrast, reformulating products,
redesigning processes, finding substitute inputs, and finding
substitute products can all eliminate or reduce the generation or
degree of hazard from waste. Thus, waste minimization at the
earliest phases of the life cycle—selection of raw materials and
design of production processes—can be the most cost-effective
methods of reducing risk from waste management, even though it
has little to do with waste management per se. (Control at the
back-end of the cycle only indirectly encourages waste
minimization by raising the cost of management.) However, direct
control of the early life cycle stages would involve a level of
detailed involvement in production processes that is rare in
American environmental regulation.
Once the waste is generated, the first-order options consist of
isolation, treatment, and release into the environment (without
treatment). Isolation can involve anything from dumping in a
trench behind the factory (as described in A Civil Action,19 for
example), to dumping in an apparently suitable location (e.g., Love
18

See generally John S. Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and
Environmental Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243 (1997–98).
19
JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (Vintage Books 1995).
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Canal20), to disposal in a state-of-the-art waste disposal facility. In
all cases, the objective is to keep the waste in place and away from
humans and the ambient environment for as long as it remains
hazardous. Untreated release is the opposite of isolation, and it
covers a range of activities from careless or willfully irresponsible
disposal (as alleged in A Civil Action) to a deliberate effort to
manage safely through dilution. A septic field is an example of the
latter, but the safety of this technique for biological hazards
contrasts with the use of a similar method for diluting radioactive
waste, which left a legacy of widespread contamination of soil and
groundwater.21
Treatment encompasses a wider array of physical techniques.
Many, many treatment technologies exist, but all are designed to
accomplish one of three second-order objectives: to destroy the
waste, to render it safe for release into the environment, or to
render it more capable of effective isolation. Destruction of waste
usually means changing its physical form so that it is separated
into non-toxic constituent parts. Incineration, for example, results
in air emissions and ash, which are supposed to pose no further (or
more controllable) hazard. Rendering safe for release into the
environment often overlaps with destruction. Destructive treatment
typically results in hazardous and non-hazardous fractions. The
non-hazardous fraction can be released to the environment, and the
hazardous fraction is isolated. Treatment is also used to change the
form or characteristics of waste so that it (or some fraction of it) is
suitable for isolation, that is, so that it will stay put. This involves
treatment to reduce volume, mobility, or a hazardous characteristic
(e.g., toxicity) of the waste, with the objective that it would be
easier to isolate (for example, there is less of it) and, if isolation
failed, would either move slowly through the environment (less
mobile) or would be less dangerous to health or the environment
(less toxic). This is the philosophy behind the 1984 “land ban”
amendments to RCRA, which prohibit land disposal of hazardous
waste unless it has been treated to reduce volume, mobility, or
toxicity.22
20
United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 997
(W.D.N.Y. 1994).
21
ROY E. GEPHART, HANFORD: A CONVERSATION ABOUT NUCLEAR WASTE
AND CLEANUP 5.26–5.30 (Battelle Press 2003).
22
42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)–(g).
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Waste management always involves one or more of the firstorder options, often in combination, and deploys a wide range of
second-order physical techniques. The essential point is that total
destruction is relatively rare (thanks to the physical laws of
conservation of matter), and so it is more common to use methods
that reduce the volume or the mobility or the toxicity of a
hazardous fraction of the wastes in order to render isolation of the
hazardous fraction more secure. The latter methods improve
safety, but they leave a legacy for future generations.
C. Isolation Over Time
Unless a waste can be treated in a way that destroys it or
allows it to be freely released into the environment, it must be
isolated, and isolation is the primary focus of the current
regulatory schemes for hazardous and nuclear waste. They specify
the kinds of wastes that can be isolated (e.g., only after
treatment),23 the locations where they may be isolated,24 and the
specifications of the facilities where they may be isolated.25 (They
also address intermediate management activities such as
transportation and temporary storage.) Since isolation only works
if it is effective over the period of time during which the waste
material remains dangerous, the problem of long-term isolation
drove the 1984 RCRA “land ban” for hazardous waste. EPA and
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) took the view, and
Congress agreed, that it is only a matter of time before virtually all
isolation systems fail and the hazardous materials in them are
released into the environment.26 Worse, such releases are likely to
be unplanned and even undetected at the time. The land ban’s
23

E.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 268 (2007) (land disposal restrictions);10 C.F.R. § 61.1
(2008) (applicability); 10 C.F.R. § 61.55 (2008) (waste classification).
24
E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.18 (2007) (general standards; specific standards in
following sections of pt. 264; 10 C.F.R. §§ 60.121, 60.122, 61.50–61.59 (2008)
(high-level waste, ownership of high-level waste and other radioactive waste,
respectively).
25
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o) (2000) (minimum technological requirements);
40 C.F.R. §§ 264.300–264.317 (2007) (same; hazardous waste landfills); 10
C.F.R. §§ 60.111–60.113 (2008) (high-level waste); 10 C.F.R. § 61.51 (2008)
(design standards).
26
APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 9, at 12–16, 75–83; OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR
HAZARDOUS WASTE (1983) [hereinafter OTA].
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treatment requirement was intended to reduce toxicity and/or
exposure (i.e., mobility) of such releases, thereby reducing risks
when such releases inevitably occur. The 1986 amendments to
CERCLA provide a litany of similar concerns:

In assessing alternative remedial actions, the President shall, at
a minimum, take into account:
(A) the long-term uncertainties associated with land disposal;
(B) the goals, objectives, and requirements of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act [RCRA];
(C) the persistence, toxicity, mobility, and propensity to
bioaccumulate of such hazardous substances and their
constituents;
(D) short- and long-term potential for adverse health effects
from human exposure;
(E) long-term maintenance costs;
(F) the potential for future remedial action costs if the
alternative remedial action in question were to fail; and
(G) the potential threat to human health and the environment
associated with excavation, transportation, and redisposal, or
containment.
The President shall select a remedial action that is protective of
human health and the environment, that is cost effective, and
that utilizes permanent solutions and alternative treatment
technologies or resource recovery technologies to the maximum
extent practicable.27

Since CERCLA is by definition all about failed isolation, it is
no surprise that Congress, in establishing clean-up standards under
CERCLA, made avoiding future failures its central concern.28
The length of time that an isolation system retains its integrity
depends on several factors: the characteristics of the waste (a
corrosive waste would degrade containers more quickly), the
initial design and construction of the isolation system, and the
continuing monitoring and repair of the isolation system. Deep
27

42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1).
See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND
STRATEGY (1985) (criticizing a policy of containing rather than treating
hazardous wastes to avoid future clean-up sites).
28
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geologic repositories like Yucca Mountain and the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP), for example, are or will be constructed in such
a way that no further human interaction will ever be necessary (or
even feasible).29 An alternative strategy, monitored retrievable
storage, assumes a constant low level of monitoring activity and
regular human intervention (at about century-long intervals) over
the course of millennia to repackage the material.30 Even
aspirationally permanent solutions like Yucca Mountain and WIPP
will require very long-term stewardship arrangements to prevent
intrusion through, for example, mining.31
There is, generally speaking, an inverse relationship between
the resources invested in the early management of waste and the
resources required to maintain isolation. As with so much in life, it
is a matter of paying now or paying later. At the simplest level,
investment in an elaborate, RCRA-compliant hazardous waste
facility now will reduce the likelihood of leakage, extend the
effective life of the facility, and alert watchers to leakage shortly
after it occurs—all of which will minimize the costs of responding
to the eventual loss of integrity of the facility. In 1983, OTA
estimated that “years or decades from now, cleaning up a site from
which there are hazardous releases, and compensating victims,
might cost 10 to 100 times the additional costs incurred today to
prevent releases.”32 Likewise, the better designed and constructed
the isolation system is, the less or less frequent ongoing care—
monitoring, repair, clean-up, re-isolation—will be required.
Nevertheless, even the most elaborately designed system will
require some minimal attention as long as the waste is dangerous,
if only to prevent intrusion by animals, plants, geologic events,
hydrologic events, or human activity. An analogy to preventive
maintenance is apt: it is far less expensive in the long run to keep
up with the needed maintenance, than to let the facility get to the
point of structural damage.
29
For more about these repositories, see sources cited in Applegate & Dycus,
supra note 6, at 10634 n.17 (citing sources).
30
Id.
31
Figuring out how to warn people thousands of years in the future is a
fascinating endeavor. An excellent, accessible account of the issues can be found
in GREGORY BENFORD, DEEP TIME: HOW HUMANITY COMMUNICATES ACROSS
MILLENNIA (Avon 1999).
32
OTA, supra note 26, at 6.
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D. Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Management Decisions
The foregoing discussion has fundamental implications for the
management of hazardous and nuclear waste. First, the advantages
in cost and environmental protection of reducing waste at or close
to the source—that is, as early in the life cycle as possible—are, if
anything, understated by the common wisdom. Hazardous and
nuclear wastes are forever, and without some level of long-term
monitoring and control, they will simply reappear again (and
again) as a problem for future generations.
Second, we cannot make the wastes that have already been
generated entirely disappear. We must in candor recognize that
irretrievable decisions have been made, which take contaminated
land and waste disposal areas out of productive circulation for
many uses, also forever. Any waste that we leave behind, in
whatever configuration, imposes some level of burden on future
generations at least to monitor and isolate it, and perhaps to
manage it actively.
Third, there are, however, opportunities to limit the burden in
the waste management choices that we make now. Investments in
aggressive management will, as a general rule, result in lower
long-term costs and less burden on future generations.
Fourth, these are not simple decisions. A thoughtful approach
to waste management policy must consider opportunities to
minimize the problem, current risks and costs, and effects far into
the future. Hazardous and nuclear waste does not lend itself to
absolute rules, nor does it lend itself to simple formulas for
arriving at appropriate solutions. There are trade-offs aplenty—
among future land uses, types of risks, persons at risk, and above
all the timing of risks—and none are subject to simple
quantification or comparison. The management of these wastes is,
in short, an excellent candidate for applying and assessing the
Breaking the Logjam principles.
II. TIME AND THE BREAKING THE LOGJAM PRINCIPLES
The safe management of hazardous and nuclear waste
implicates several of the Breaking the Logjam principles, as
Professors Stewart and Adler explain in their papers. The
principles have additional implications when the temporal
dimension of waste management is considered. In addition, the
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temporal dimension suggests the value of an additional principle,
institutional learning and the conservation of options, for
regulatory decision making.
A. Cross-Cutting Regulatory Approaches that
Address Underlying Causes
The principle that “existing statutes must be restructured to
match the true character of environmental problems and their
underlying causes” matches perfectly the observation that the best
way to deal with wastes is not to generate them in the first place.
An effective hazardous waste policy must focus on the true cradle
of the waste, its underlying cause: the decisions that led to its
creation in the first place. The decisions to make a product or to
perform an activity at all (or in a certain amount), to formulate the
product or to design the activity in a certain way, and to design the
production process in a particular way, all affect the volume and
nature of the resulting waste streams. Such changes to the early
parts of the life cycle will not eliminate all hazardous and nuclear
waste, of course, but waste minimization must be the foundation of
the regulatory scheme.
The fundamental difficulty in developing effective waste
minimization programs is gaining regulatory access, so to speak, to
the early production decisions. In general, governmental regulation
focuses on the externalities of enterprises. Externalities offer the
best justification for imposing collective public controls, and they
are the most politically acceptable interventions. For example,
much of the resistance to the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
which has left it largely inactive,33 is founded on the idea that
government should not regularly go “inside” business operations;
its focus should be on controlling external effects. Whatever the
merits of this view, it was implicitly supported by the differential
treatment of workplace inspections and ambient pollution: the
former requires a warrant, and the latter can be warrantlessly
observed and sampled at the fenceline.34 Moreover, the internal
33

See THOMAS O. MCGARITY AND SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK:
THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION 3–30 (Praeger 1993).
34
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–38 (1986); Marshall
v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978); Air Pollution Variance Bd. of
Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); see also Cary
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operations of economic enterprises are extremely various. The
familiarity of the enterprise’s management is particularly valuable
with respect to operational choices and designs; conversely,
external regulators are most likely to err in creating detailed
requirements in these areas. It would be silly to abjure all
regulation of enterprises’ internal operations—and environmental,
health, and safety laws wisely do not do so—but the internalexternal divide poses a real challenge for addressing “underlying
causes” of hazardous waste disposal on land.
As a result, federal legislation on waste minimization and
pollution prevention is basically voluntary. The Pollution
Prevention Act,35 for example, recognizes the value of addressing
the early life cycle of pollutants, but does little more than offer
weak incentives to develop and implement waste minimization.36
RCRA requires certain waste generators to have waste
minimization plans in place.37 The most effective systems have
instead attacked the problem indirectly—from the outside, so to
speak. “Reputation tax”38 systems publicize the hazardous
emissions of a facility or hazardous contents of a product, with the
expectation that such publicity will create a strong incentive to
eliminate or reduce the hazardous discharges or contents. The
Toxics Release Inventory established by the 1986 amendments to
CERCLA (the Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act (EPCRA)) required industrial facilities to disclose their
releases of significant amounts of designated hazardous substances
into any medium,39 and industry reacted to the publicity by
reducing such releases.40 The means of achieving the reductions
Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOCIETY REV. 691 (2003)
(describing the difficulties of regulating “inside” an enterprise).
35
42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–13109 (2000).
36
See Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pollution
Prevention Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 170–174, 188–189 (1992).
37
42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(b), 6925(h).
38
See John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and
Demand for Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
39
42 U.S.C. § 11023.
40
See JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE
ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM
225–26 (Cambridge U. Press 2005); David W. Case, Corporate Environmental
Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76
U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 381–82 (2005).
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are nowhere stated in the statute or regulations; they were entirely
in the hands of the enterprises themselves.
California’s Proposition 6541 imposes a similar notification
requirement for chemicals “known to the state to cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity” when they are released to the air,
groundwater, or contained in products. Even though it, too, does
not mandate any production process or input, the enactment of
Proposition 65 has resulted in abandonment of marginal products,
reformulations, and dramatic reductions in emissions and
contents—exactly the kinds of decisions that waste minimization
programs hope to affect.42 The Massachusetts Toxics Use
Reduction Act addresses planning more directly by requiring the
manufacturers and users of toxic chemicals to generate usereduction plans. While the plans need neither be followed nor
publicly disclosed, the investment in the development of the plans
is expected to encourage their implementation.43
Breaking the Logjam. Two specific policy devices can be
deployed to encourage addressing hazardous waste at its source or
as far upstream as possible. The first and more aggressive is an
outright ban on the substances that constitute or contribute to much
of the hazardous waste problem. Despairing of the “fine-tuning”
approach to toxic water pollutants, Professor Oliver Houck
concluded:
The near-routine predictions of layoffs, plant closings, and
economic ruin notwithstanding, when the paper industry has
had, at last, to convert to a less polluting process, it has done so.
At bottom, the struggle is not over the ability not to pollute, but
over lead time and competitiveness. Any solution to toxic
pollution will have to accommodate these legitimate industry
needs. A solution, on the other hand, that fosters differing state
standards and differing state applications of these standards
breeds uncertainty, contention, unfairness, and endless
41

Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Proposition 65),
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–25249.13 (West 2006).
42
See Carl Cranor, Information Generation and Use Under Proposition 65:
Model Provisions for Other Postmarket Laws?, 83 IND. L.J. 609, 613 (2008);
Clifford Rechtschaffen & Patrick Williams, The Continued Success of
Proposition 65 in Reducing Toxic Exposures, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,850 (ENVTL.
L. INST. 2005); David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed
Facts, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,232 (2002).
43
Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 34, at 700.
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opposition.44

The device of prohibition with lead time for adjustment is
responsible for two of the most celebrated successes of
environmental regulation: lead in gasoline and ozone depleting
substances. The choice of target substances must be a careful one,
of course. For example, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants (POPs) adopts an outright ban on eleven of the
so-called Dirty Dozen, which reflects steps already taken in most
industrialized countries. However, it extends (indefinitely with
regular review) the lead time for a total phase-out of DDT which,
despite its notoriety, remains an essential element of the fight
against malaria in the developing world.45 A place to begin the
process of identifying phase-out candidates for hazardous waste
would be the substances (primarily chemical and petroleum
feedstocks) targeted by the tax that originally created the
Superfund,46 because that list was designed to match (roughly)
clean-up expenditures—that is, the very last stage of the hazardous
waste life cycle—with their ultimate sources.47
A second and less aggressive approach would be a direct
monetary tax on the model of the reputation tax described above.
Numerous observers have advocated a “tail-end” waste tax as a
way to reduce upstream waste generation. Twenty-five years ago,
the OTA suggested a variable fee (based on the likelihood of
requiring later clean-up) as a way to reduce Superfund
expenditures.48 Subsequent commentators have noted that tax
systems are relatively simple and cheap to operate, they afford
nearly total flexibility to generators to determine how and how
much to reduce waste generation, they provide a continuing
incentive to reduce and innovate, and the tax rates can be adjusted
44

Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean
Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,528, 10,554 (1991); see also SIDNEY A.
SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 158–72 (Stanford U. Press 2003) (recommending “backend adjustments,” rigorous general controls subject to specific modification as
needed).
45
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, supra note 3, at
annex B, part II.
46
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661, 9507. The taxes have since expired.
47
See generally Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 376 (1986) (holding
that the Superfund tax preempts certain state clean-up taxes).
48
OTA, supra note 26, at 30–33.
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over time to respond to the system’s success vel non in reducing
waste.49 Moreover, a tax system can be combined effectively with
other techniques. For example, the effect of a tax could be
intensified by offering “rebates” for preferred or demonstrably
superior forms of treatment and disposal.50 Combinations can also
remedy problems that taxes are not good at achieving, such as
avoidance of concentrations of risk51 and establishing minimum
standards for disposal (which are related problems), and it is
entirely possible to combine systems to address these problems.
For example, it is entirely feasible to establish “command and
control” disposal technology standards, while relying on a tax
system to reduce waste generation.
The waste or reputation tax approach not only implements the
Breaking the Logjam principle of addressing underlying causes,
but it also exemplifies the principle that “new statutes and
regulatory programs need to harness the power of markets and
information disclosure to increase environmental protection.” Like
taxes, the EPCRA and California disclosure systems allow the
underlying activity to continue at any level (or none) that the
enterprise chooses, but there is a distinct cost (in reputation)
associated with it. Acceptable products, appropriate raw materials,
and production process are all left to the individual enterprise,
giving them the maximum flexibility to organize their operations
most efficiently.

49

See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlman, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming
than Cap and Trade 37–47 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 117, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1109167; Robert W. Hahn,
An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazardous Waste, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 201, 219 (1988); Clifford S. Russell, Economic Incentives in the
Management of Hazardous Waste, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257 (1988); Richard
B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
21, 99–100 (2001); see also Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the
Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 566–76 (2007)
(pointing out that tax systems are not purely market mechanisms, because they
require governmental decisions concerning appropriate rates).
50
See Stewart, supra note 49; Russell, supra note 49. The tax-rebate
proposal parallels Professor Karkkainen’s “flip” strategy described in his
contribution to this symposium. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Framing Rules:
Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75 (2008).
51
Stewart, supra note 49, at 101.
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B. Openness About Trade-Offs
The temporal dimension also implicates the principle that
“[n]ew statutes must acknowledge that trade-offs are inevitable
and ensure that they are made in public view based on reliable
information.” In addition to the contemporary trade-offs that
Professors Stewart and Adler identify, hazardous and nuclear
waste management involves trade-offs among the present and the
multiple futures: waste elimination or minimization through
changes in inputs and processes; initial treatment, storage, and
disposal; the remediation period; the foreseeable future at which
disposal decisions are aimed; and the long-term future of
monitoring, repair, prepackaging, or clean-up. Decisions made
now, or postponed now, will determine who will be exposed to
risks, which risks, and at what scale. For costs, the questions are
who will pay and how much.
The remediation of failed waste management is a particularly
compelling example of trade-offs across time. EPA is required to
balance the risks of remediation itself against eight other criteria in
determining an appropriate clean-up remedy,52 but EPA rarely
gives remediation risks the kind of thorough consideration that it
does many of the other CERCLA decision making criteria.53 There
are several likely reasons for this, such as a tendency to think of
pollution control as a fairly simple and straightforward (if
expensive) operation, even though that is demonstrably untrue of
waste management. The risks to humans arise from direct exposure
to the dangerous materials themselves (the extreme case is the
firefighters at Chernobyl). In most cases, these exposures can be
limited to reasonably safe levels, but at the substantial cost of
protective equipment and work procedures that extend the length
and complexity of the clean-up effort. Perhaps the most serious
remediation risk, though, is participation in the ordinary
construction and transportation activities of clean-up itself—
digging, driving, and so on. There are many valid reasons why we
might not consider the magnitude of these risks to outweigh
environmental harm, even if they are statistically higher than the
toxic risk—they are voluntarily undertaken by workers, they are
not different in kind or degree from other construction and
52
53

40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii).
Applegate & Wesloh, supra note 16.
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transportation risks, the present generation should restore the
planet for future generations—but they are hardly irrelevant to
clean-up decisions. Likewise, remediation harm to ecosystems,
such as removing contaminated topsoil or sediments, is also
substantial in many cases, and again there is no simple formula
balancing them against present and future risks. The factual and
normative complexity of these trade-offs cries out for transparent
and well informed decisions—“made in public view based on
reliable information,” as the Breaking the Logjam principle puts it.
Waste management statutes like CERCLA, RCRA, and the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act tend to marginalize remediation risks,
because the statutes themselves represent a firm commitment to
the active management of present wastes with the objective of
protecting future generations from the mistakes of the present and
past generations. Turning our attention, then, to the multiple
futures of hazardous waste, the principle trade-off is the familiar
one that the more we do now, the less we will have to do in the
future. Put another way, there is a direct trade-off between longterm assurance of isolation and short-term cost.54 Aggressive
isolation and stabilization of wastes and contamination will
undoubtedly be more costly, but they will spare future generations
from the necessity of themselves dealing with the waste (beyond,
say, maintenance and monitoring of disposal facilities). By
contrast, remedial plans that depend heavily on so-called
institutional controls (land use controls or deed restrictions, for
example) will require active long-term stewardship to ensure that
the controls remain effective. Similarly, doing no more than
capping contaminated soils in place will slow migration of
contaminants, even substantially, but the cap not only must be
maintained intact, but migration will ultimately require more
aggressive measures. “Attempting to minimize present costs will
almost certainly lead to a transfer of greater costs to the future.”55
As with remediation risks, the foregoing are real and
inevitable trade-offs, and one cannot say a priori that a particular
result (now or later) is always more appropriate. Statutes like
RCRA and CERCLA sensibly privilege long-term solutions, but
that is mainly in order to counteract the tendency to impose risks
54
55

See Applegate, supra note 18.
OTA, supra note 26, at 5.
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and costs on future generations, whether through the formal use of
discounting procedures or the all too human temptation to put off
today what others can do tomorrow. Professor Brown Weiss has
written compellingly of “fairness to future generations.”56 She
begins with the equality of generations, such that no generation
(present or future) suffers undue hardship on account of others,
and no generation is expected to predict the goals and values of
others. These lead her to substantive principles of conservation of
options, conservation of quality, and conservation of access to
resources.57 The fundamental choices are therefore normative—
who is at risk and how much, who pays and how much. They can
and should be informed by available information, but information
and analytical tools will not make decisions for us. Professors
Farber and Hemmersbaugh add the important observation that
consideration of effects on future generations is essential to the
long-term sustainability of current decisions.58
Breaking the Logjam. Breaking the logjam will require
statutory frameworks that permit the trade-off of present and future
to be frankly considered and resolved, as well as institutions that
are capable of addressing long-term consequences. Of the relevant
statutes, CERCLA does the best job of expressly identifying the
relevant criteria and giving an indication of their relative priority.59
RCRA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations under
the Atomic Energy Act make many of these choices through
treatment requirements and disposal standards, but they, too, leave
some room for consideration both in the setting of general
standards and in their application to individual disposal decisions.
The logjam, instead, is with regulatory decision making processes.
Reasonably available information concerning long-term
consequences must be gathered and disclosed, affected
56

EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
(1989).
57
Id.; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, DECIDING
FOR THE FUTURE: BALANCING RISKS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS FAIRLY ACROSS
GENERATIONS 9–13 (1997) (setting out similar principles for intergenerational
decision making).
58
See Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the
Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 267, 293 (1993).
59
42 U.S.C. § 9621(b), (d) (2000).
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stakeholders must be involved in a meaningful way, and they and
the decision makers must expressly address the trade-offs between
present and future in reaching a final decision.60 A good model is
the “analytic-deliberative process” advocated by the National
Academy of Sciences for risk-based decisions.61 Scientific analysis
(and, in the case of future effects, predictions) are developed in
consultation with stakeholders and form the basis for both public
participation and administrative decisions. A robust up-front
deliberative process provides the basis for legally and politically
sustainable trade-off decisions.
In addition, without institutions to address the long-term
environmental consequences, it is unrealistic to expect that
legislatures, agencies, or the general public will ever be
comfortable with accepting long-term management for lower
present costs—nor would that be a responsible course of action.
An effective long-term stewardship program should demonstrate
transparency concerning long- and short-term risks while
practicing life-cycle accounting, documentation, identification of
stewards, enforceability, redundancy, public involvement,
sustainability, and flexibility and responsiveness to future
conditions.62 Institutions for managing long-term stewardship
programs will need to identify hazardous and nuclear waste
disposal sites that have potential long-term effects on the
environment (that is, nearly all of them), keep track of their
condition and legal status, and possess the capacity to remedy (or
cause others to do so) leaks, intrusions, or other environmental
effects.63
Few, if any, extant institutions have such capacities which can
also be counted upon to last for decades or centuries into the
future. At a minimum, such institutions would require a very clear
sense of a long-term protective mission (like the National Park
60

Applegate & Dycus, supra note 6, at 10650–51.
COMM’N ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 3, 6
(Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996); See COMM. ON RISK-BASED
APPROACHES FOR DISPOSITION OF TRANSURANIC AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AND DECISIONS ABOUT DISPOSITION OF
TRANSURANIC AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 7 (National Academies
Press 2005).
62
Applegate & Dycus, supra note 7, at 10644–45.
63
Id. at 10651–52.
61
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Service, perhaps), which would provide the necessary incentive to
continue stewardship activities for the long term. A clear mission
might also permit such an institution plausibly to represent
(loosely defined) future generations in present deliberations. Stable
long-term funding, too, would be a necessity, and perhaps the
waste tax suggested above could be used to create a fund for this
purpose.
C. Scaling Regulatory Authority to the Problem
Professor Adler makes the case that the environmental effects
of hazardous waste are almost entirely local.64 Whatever our
worries are about leaking waste sites and spreading contamination,
the direct impact of the problem is generally quite limited in
geographic terms. Adler concludes from this that decisions about
the disposal of hazardous waste are essentially local land use
decisions—whether to place waste in a particular location, the
level of risk to which the nearby population should be exposed, the
design and waste acceptance criteria for the facility, and so on.
There are several ways in which the management of
hazardous waste is not simply a local problem, however. Waste is,
as Professor Adler recognizes, itself an item of interstate—and,
indeed, international—commerce, and he makes a special point of
ensuring that interstate commerce in hazardous waste be protected
against legal (the dormant Commerce Clause) and political
(NIMBY) restraints. The irresponsible shipment of hazardous
wastes to economically depressed parts of the United States or to
developing countries that have little or no capacity for minimally
appropriate management is therefore not a local problem at all, but
a global problem that needs to be addressed at the national and
supranational level. More closely related to the temporal issues
that are our focus, efforts at waste minimization through product
choice and design change will be undermined, at least to some
degree, by the existence of localities which, for whatever reason,
welcome substantial amounts of hazardous waste disposal. Nuclear
waste policy, too, is national and international, inasmuch as efforts
to encourage or discourage the use of nuclear power—to say
nothing of nuclear weapons—are distinctly matters of national and
international policy. Moreover, it is a cornerstone of U.S. nuclear
64

See Adler, supra note 2.
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waste policy that widely distributed spent fuel is to be gathered
into one or two national repositories for disposal.
A more difficult problem of scale involves the intersection of
the geographic limitations of the effects of hazardous waste and
their temporal extensiveness. While the geographic effects of
contamination may never extend beyond the residents of River
City, all of the residents of River City will change across
generations. Over the millennia that hazardous and nuclear wastes
remain hazardous, the social and political organization of that
place will change drastically. Decisions about the location and
isolation measures made by River City today are surely more
remote from the people of River City in 3000 or 4000 or 10,000
C.E. than decisions made in Washington, D.C. today—and yet
decisions to accept certain kinds of waste, to place them in certain
locations, and to isolate them to a certain degree will directly affect
those future generations. One cannot, of course, simply equate
temporal and geographic distance. Nevertheless, the temporal
dimension of these wastes at least suggests that a larger polity is
affected by waste decisions.65 While it is by no means obvious that
the larger polity is best represented by the federal, as opposed to
(say) the relevant state government, there might be some
advantage in making such decisions at some remove from the most
immediate local concerns.
Breaking the Logjam. As with trade-offs, the appropriate way
to address the time scale of hazardous and nuclear waste
management is through implementation of the principles of
transparency and deliberation that the National Academy of
Sciences has recommended in connection with risk regulation. In
the long run, candid and complete disclosure of the known facts
and uncertainties, and candid and complete acknowledgement of
the relevant policy choices, will permit the kind of open
deliberation that yields robust and lasting decisions. It is
optimistic, but surely not utopian, to suggest that a decision
making process that embodies these qualities would enjoy the kind
of judicial and political deference to administrative judgment that
currently eludes such judgments. A bureaucratic culture of
suppressing scientific information or of dressing policy choices in
65

See Sinden, supra note 49, at 588–94 (describing the ways in which local
land-use decisions can have wide-ranging impacts).
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scientific clothing breeds the kind of distrust that causes courts,
legislatures, and the general public to resist unwanted regulatory
decisions to the last, and to insist on legislative directives
(“substantial evidence”) and judicial doctrines (“hard look”) that
contribute directly to the logjam. Thus, while there is much to be
said for placing the essentially local aspects of hazardous waste
management at the center of deliberations, the failure to
acknowledge and analyze wider temporal implications—in
particular, by the aggressive use of legal doctrines like the dormant
Commerce Clause to foreclose legal and political objections—will
only push the logjam a little farther downstream.
D. Institutional Learning and the Conservation of Options
The temporal dimension of hazardous and nuclear waste also
suggests the utility of a new Breaking the Logjam principle. In any
long-term effort, one must expect that over time we will come to
understand the underlying problem better and will develop better
ideas and capacities for addressing it. These improvements can
only be implemented if the regulatory system is capable of
learning and if present decisions leave options open for the future.
Humility is the first reason to permit learning and retain
options. Our ability to predict the future of physical locations or
human technology is extraordinarily limited. It is hard to imagine
how the human events and technologies of the Twentieth Century
could have been predicted with any certainty in the Nineteenth.
Indeed, it is the occasional good guess (H.G. Wells comes to mind)
that stands out for its rarity. Without indulging in dystopic
fantasies (Road Warrior scenarios in which legacy hazardous
waste will be the least of humankind’s problems), it is fair to ask
whether we will be able successfully to transfer knowledge of the
location and dangers of hazardous waste to the future. Likewise,
while technological optimism seems amply justified in general
terms (the Twentieth Century being the outstanding example), it is
a different matter to count on particular solutions to particular
problems as the way to preserve options or ensure safety.66
In addition to having humility about our ability to predict the
future, we must respect the future and its inhabitants. As Professor
66

See James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-easy Case for
Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985).
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Brown Weiss observes, we cannot predict the values of future
generations any more than we can predict their technology or
situation, and so we should seek to conserve options for future
generations to choose from. Irreversible decisions are unavoidable,
of course, and sometimes irretrievable solutions are the most
appropriate ones. Deep geological disposal of nuclear waste, for
example, is intended to be irretrievable and may well be the most
responsible way to address this most difficult of problems. On the
other hand, advocates of monitored retrievable storage argue that
there are greater advantages to being able to revisit disposal
choices and technologies in the future. Brown Weiss’s approach
counsels caution (not inaction) in making irretrievable
commitments.
Conserving options into the future is of little use if regulatory
systems are incapable of responding to changed conditions. Under
the rubric of “reflexive environmental law,”67 and “adaptive
management,”68 scholars have advocated legal regimes that adjust
to new conditions. Professor Driesen proposes a similar approach,
which he calls “economic dynamics.”69 Accepting that our
understanding of consequences in the present is constrained, which
sharply limits our ability to develop an adequate long-term
analysis of, say, costs and benefits, economic dynamics counsels
regulatory designs that adjust to change and encourage
innovation—“learning while doing,” in Doremus’s phrase.
Breaking the Logjam. Responses to hazardous and nuclear
waste—and to any long-term environmental problem—must be
adaptable wherever possible, so that we can take maximum
advantage of what we do know now and be minimally dependent
on our knowledge of the future. This calls for institutional
structures that adjust and learn from experience, and for
substantive decisions that conserve options to permit learning. In
the depths of the Great Depression, President Franklin Roosevelt
67

See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U.L.
REV. 1227 (1995).
68
See Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in
Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 550–57 (2007)
(describing adaptive management).
69
David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: CostBenefit Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L.
REV. 501 (2003).
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famously urged governmental experimentation: “It is common
sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try
another.”70 Informal rulemaking, with its basic notice-andcomment procedures,71 may be said to embody this approach. It
allows agencies the widest possible range of inputs, the greatest
flexibility in considering them, and the speediest path to the
implementation of agency conclusions. It also allows agencies to
experiment, to change course, to admit failure and try something
else—above all, to learn from experience.
This administrative process, while nominally the basis for
most hazardous waste regulation, has “ossified”72 over time as the
result of formal legislative mandate (so-called hybrid rulemaking),
aggressive judicial review (the “hard look” approach73), executive
analytical requirements (for example, Office of Management and
Budget review), and changing agency culture. Some procedural
complexity is inevitable to achieving a well-informed,
participatory system of administration, but the clear objective
should be full and public consideration based on available
information, followed by a prompt agency decision and deferential
judicial review. As with consideration of trade-offs, confidence in
agency decisions reached in a simple and (relatively) speedy
process would be justified by a strong initial process of agency
deliberation; by the ready ability of the agency, using informal
rulemaking as originally conceived, to rectify errors and adapt to
new information or circumstances; and by a firm practice or legal
requirement that agencies regularly review their decisions in terms
of their stated goals.74
70

“The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands
bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it.
If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something. The
millions who are in want will not stand idly by silently forever while the things
to satisfy their needs are within easy reach.” President Franklin Roosevelt,
Commencement Address at Oglethorpe University (May 23, 1932), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/66/19/47019.html.
71
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
72
See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992) (quoting former EPA
General Counsel E. Donald Elliott).
73
Changing course, for instance, can be considered a warning sign of agency
irrationality. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FTC, 444 F.2d 841, 851
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
74
A review requirement is capable of abuse, of course, and so it must be
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In sum, a long-term approach must assume that conditions
will change and understanding improve; therefore, it must also
provide for an agency to return to a decision multiple times and to
respond nimbly to the changed circumstances.
CONCLUSION
It is refreshing to have a discussion of environmental
regulation, such as the one that Professors Stewart, Schoenbrod,
and Wyman have initiated, that is couched in terms of principles—
not of absolute principles of right and wrong, but of principles that,
as Professor Dworkin put it, “state[] a reason that argues in one
direction, but [do] not necessitate a particular decision.”75
Principles of this kind properly reflect the complexity and
contingency of environmental decision making and the multiple
goals that it seeks to serve. Principles remind us that simple
formulas cannot provide real answers. The temporal dimension of
hazardous and nuclear waste illustrates the power of principles.
The Breaking the Logjam principles unquestionably have
application to these wastes and point us in useful directions, but
the underlying facts and the overarching goals are too complicated
for formulaic application. A principle, moreover, “is flexible,
interrelates with other principles, does not dictate a particular
outcome, and can be subject to different interpretations.”76 The
Breaking the Logjam principles do not provide a priori answers
for every case, but instead they form the basis for a rich and
deliberative analysis of what we know and do not know about a
particular situation, and what we want to achieve and want to
avoid.

backed by adequate agency resources to undertake such reviews without
compromising its on-going responsibilities, and it should not routinely be linked
to so-called sunset provisions that terminate approaches without regard to their
effectiveness.
75
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 26 (1967).
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Elizabeth Fisher, Precaution, Law and Principles of Good Administration,
52(6) WATER SCI. & TECH. 19, 19 (2005) (discussing the precautionary
principle); see also Elizabeth Fisher, Precaution, Precaution Everywhere:
Developing a ‘Common Understanding’ of the Precautionary Principle in the
European Community, 9 MAASTRICHT J. EUROPEAN & COMP. L. 9 (2002).

